the uniformity of acceptance left the historical record bare,' 8 one may never know the exact reasons for the Framers' enactment of the venue provisions. Justice Joseph Story, an early constitutional historian, did advance some possible and probable justifications of the venue provisions:
The object ... is to secure the party accused from being dragged to a trial in some distant state, away from his friends, witnesses, and neighborhood; and thus subjected to the verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no common sympathy, or who may even cherish animosities, or prejudices against him. Besides this; a trial in a distant state or territory might subject a party to the most oppressive expenses, or perhaps even to the1 9 inability of procuring proper witnesses to establish his innocence.
Such historically-accepted justifications prompted constitutional scholar Drew Kershen to conclude "that the draftsmen of Article III, Section 2, clause three intended limited venue to be of benefit primarily to the accused. The Declaration of Independence charged the King with "protecting [troops] by a mock trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States," 22 allowing a leading commentator to conclude that the "circumvention of the judgment of the victimized community was attacked as a 'Mock Trial' system in the Declaration of Independence. 23 The Framers, with recent history of governmental abuse in mind, recognized that a venue provision would limit the possible abuse of power otherwise available if one could manipulate the geographical location of a trial. 24 Another compelling justification for the venue provisions, suggested by more recent scholarship, was that the provisions protected a community's right to stage the trial of local offenses.25 States have traditionally held the balance of power within the federal system over shaping criminal statutes in a way that reflects local preferences. 26 As the federal government has increasingly encroached into this territory, the states, through the venue provision, have had the consolation of trying the accused with local juries, thus mirroring, to some extent, local values in a trial's outcome. 27 If the federal government has the power to choose venue, this consolation to the states is lost. 28 The constitutional venue provisions thus protect at least three policy interests. First, the venue provisions protect the rights of the accused.2 The accused is more likely to stand trial in a familiar or procedurally sound venue: witnesses to the alleged crime most likely live in the area of the crime; tangible evidence of the crime is most often found at the place of the crime; *°0 and the accused is also more likely to be tried at the accused's place of residence, allowing for comfort and support of family and friends and knowledge of local counsel.' 1 Second, federal governmental power against the individual is checked. 2 Limiting venue can help prevent the federal government from gaining an advantage or leverage that can come with the power to choose venue in a more or less sympathetic state. 3 And, finally, federal governmental power against the individual states is curtailed. The venue provisions allow each state the right to 21 See id. at 243; cf. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 634 (1961) (venue provisions should not be so freely construed as to give the government the choice of a favorable venue). (Alito, J., dissenting) .
"See United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1987) ; see also supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
' See AMAR, supra note 23, at x; see also supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
try the person who actually committed the crime within the state's territory. 35 Judge Alito of the Third Circuit summed up the prevailing justifications for this constitutional mandate by stating that the "provisions were meant to put in place important substantive protections against government abuse. 3 6
Constitutionality of Federal Legislation That Broadens Venue
While Congress cannot altogether negate the constitutional venue guarantee, it can broadly define a crime so that the commission of the crime could likely cross district and state borders, thus providing a number of venue choices. And Congress, without constitutional challenge, has explicitly provided broadened venue provisions for particular offenses, so long as the venue bears some relation to the offense.
Pushing the borders both constitutionally and geographically of congressional venue-stretching, courts have concluded that venue is proper in conspiracy cases in any district where an overt act which furthered the conspiracy happened or anywhere a conspiracy agreement was formed. The Supreme Court approved this rule, permitting trials in districts where defendants have never stepped foot, despite "its dilutent effect upon venue rights." 40 The Court thus signaled its willingness to weaken venue rights in order to strengthen Congress's ability to deter crime. 4 ' Therefore, in order for the judiciary to broadly interpret the criminal venue, Congress must establish a rational nexus between the crime and the venue within a venue provi-41 sion, or a court must find from the words of the statute that "5 SeeAMAR, supra note 23, at x.
Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 861 (Alito,J., dissenting "See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1994) (continuing offense may be tried "in any district in which the offense was begun, continued, or completed .... And murder may be tried in any district were the injury was inflicted... without regard to the place where the death occurs.").
" ' See United States v. Caldwell, 16 F.3d 623, 624 (5th Cir. 1994) ; see also United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116 , 1125 (5th Cir. 1984 The Supreme Court has given Congress a green light to structure statutes in a way that defines venue broadly enough to reach criminals with only the slightest of ties to certain geographical areas. 4 Congress, however, has refrained from placing a venue provision on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), which would explicitly allow for the firearm crime to be properly tried in any venue where the predicate crime was committed. 4 5 At the time of Rodriguez-Moreno's offense, the substantive portion of § 924(c) (1) read: "whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . .uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years .... . 4 6 Although Congress could have, in a separate venue provision, specifically tied the gun offense with the proper venue of the underlying drug-trafficking crime, Congress failed to do so. Furthermore, the congressional history of the statute provides sparse ground from which explanations for the omission of a venue provision can be cultivated."
Congress originally adopted § 924(c) (1) as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968."g This section of the Gun Control Act created a separate offense if a gun was either used in the commission of a felony or was carried unlawfully during the commission 43 See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944) . of a felony. 0 Courts were given wide discretion in setting sentences for this offense (between one and ten years in prison), in addition to the penalty for the predicate offense. 51 The public's increased dissatisfaction with judicial discretion in sentencing, which paralleled increasing national crime rates through the 19 7 0s and 1980s, lead to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which instituted mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines. 2 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act amended § 924(c) (1), creating a minimum prison sentence of five years for " [w] hoever uses or carries a firearm" during and in relation to any violent crime, in addition to the prison sentence for the predicate violent crime. 3 Soon after this amendment, courts encountered difficulty interpreting what constituted a "violent crime," especially in relation to the offense of drug-trafficking. 4 In the majority of cases, courts decided that drug-trafficking, in itself, was not a 55 violent crime. Congress expressed disagreement with the majority interpretation by amending § 924(c) (1) within the Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986 to include as a violent crime the predicate act of drug-trafficking. 56 Congress has since amended the statute to provide for harsher sentencing depending on the class of weapon used, 57 Whoever: (1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or;, (2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of a felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years....
See id.
12 See Cindy Crane, Note, L. Smith v. United States: Enhanced Penalties For Using Guns As Barter in Drug Deals, 20J. CONTEMP. L. 295, 299 (1994 " See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994).
-1 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1990), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994) . If the firearm used in the predicate offense is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun, or a semiautomatic assault weapon, the minimum sentence is ten years; if the firearm is a ma-924(c) (1) to make it a crime to "possess" a firearm in furtherance of any violent crime or drug-trafficking, in addition to simply "using" or "carrying" a firearm. 8 This amendment was made in response to the Supreme Court's relatively narrow interpretation of the word "uses, 5 9 and continues the congressional pattern of building a more inclusive, stiffer statute.
It is widely accepted, drawing from Congress' amendment pattern of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), that the statute reflects congressional concern with high national rates of violent and narcotics-related crime. 6 ' While this is a logical inference, deterring violent crime was not the primary point of congressional debate when § 924(c) (1) was enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968.1 What little is recorded of the congressional debate suggests that the focus was whether § 924(c) (1) would be constitutional if applied to state crimes and not on whether this statute would deter the predicate crimes. 2 Thus, it can be logically inferred that Congress enacted § 924(c) (1) not simply to enhance punishment but with the intention to punish and deter the underlying crime, the illegal use of firearms. 3 Despite the legislative pattern of expanding the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) through many amendments, Congress has yet to attach a separate venue provision.6 Congress has not explicitly tied the firearm offense to any venue where the predicate crime takes place, though it has the power to do so.65 In United States v. Corona,6 the defendant was tried in Nevada and convicted of both conspiracy to distribute cocaine and the substantive crimes associated with the conspiracy, which included the distribution of cocaine and the use of a firearm during the distribution. 6 Both the distribution of the cocaine and the use of the firearm occurred only in California, though overt acts of conspiracy happened in both California and Nevada. 0 On appeal the defendant argued that venue for the substantive offenses, including the § 924(c) (1) charge, was improper in Nevada. 7 The Ninth Circuit conducted a separate venue analysis for the conspiracy and the substantive crimes, determining that venue was improper in Nevada for the substantive offenses. 72 The court adopted the "verb test" and thus examined the verbs of the § 924(c) (1) offense to determine where Congress expected proper venue to lie. 3 Finding that one could only "use" or "carry" a gun in violation of § 924(c) (1) when in connection with the substantive predicate offense, the Ninth Circuit held that prosecution in a venue where the underlying conspiracy charge took place is not proper under § 924(c) (1) if the weapon was not used or carried in that venue. 74 The Ninth Circuit in Corona did not examine the government's policy concerns, nor did it pay heed to any extrapolation of congressional 34 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1994 [Vol. 90 intent, but, rather, the court conducted the venue analysis based on the statute as written by Congress. 7 5 Acknowledging the possible public policy difficulties inherent in its decision, the court stated "while [tying venue to the underlying offense] might make some sense from a policy standpoint, it runs counter to the venue principles established by the Constitution, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the federal courts." 76 Furthermore, the court noted that the government "could have and should have" litigated all of the offenses in California. 77 The court concluded that because public policy concerns are insufficient to overrule constitutional principles, 78 a conviction under § 924(c) (1) could not be prosecuted where the conspiracy occurred if the firearm was not used or carried in that venue.
United States v. Pomranz
In United States v. Pomranz, 0 the defendant was charged with several counts relating to the distribution of marijuana, including the use of a gun in connection with the underlying crime of drug distribution. 81 The drug trafficking occurred in North Texas, while the firearm was used in Oklahoma City. 8 2 After being convicted on all counts in a North Texas trial, the defendant appealed. 3 Citing Corona, the defendant argued that the proper venue to try the § 924(c) (1) offense was Oklahoma City.
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The Fifth Circuit disagreed.85 The court explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, and stated that the court's analysis would "effectively undermine the Congressional intent to curb the violence inherently associated with high-level drug deals. ' The court observed the consistent increase in deter- rence value throughout the § 924(c) (1) amendments, 87 and noted that the legislation's sponsor, United States Representative Richard Poff, explained that one of the statute's objectives was to "persuade a man who is tempted to commit a federal felony to leave his gun at home. '' m The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that Congress intended § 924(c) (1) to provide "a maximum deterrence a~anst using firearms" during the commission of other crimes.
The court did not analyze the words of the statute itself, but instead concluded that, unless venue is constructed broadly, the congressional intent of deterring violence "inherently associated with high-level drug deals" would be undermined.
9 0 Placing the goal of deterrence above all other considerations, the court acknowledged that policy concerns, particularly the possible additional costs the government might incur in prosecuting a convicted felon a second time, were paramount. 1 To provide maximum deterrence at minimum prosecutorial cost, the court determined that a § 924(c) (1) violation is sufficiently intertwined with the predicate act of drug trafficking or committing a violent crime as to warrant trial in the same venue, regardless of where the firearm was actually used or carried. 92 Cognizant of the constitutional concerns inherent in its decision, the court noted: "[W] e do not believe that our holding seriously infringes on the defendant's rights since this Court treats the right to venue with less deference than other constitutional rights. While the court gave examples of when venue rights were treated with less deference than other constitutional rights in 17 See id. at 160. The court noted that Congress first amended § 924(c) to make clear that the defendant was sentenced under both the predicate offense and the gun offense: "[T]he statute underwent further changes to increase the severity of punishment by: (1) requiring that the mandatory sentence run consecutively rather than concurrently with the predicate crime, (2) substantially increasing the mandatory penalty violations, and (3) denying parole or probation privileges during the § 924(c) (1) sentence." Id.
Id. at 160 n.5 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 22, 231 (1968) In October 1994, the first attempted transaction in this new business relationship was foiled when two of Torres-Montalvo's runners were arrested while en route to New York, and fourteen kilograms of cocaine were seized. 0 9 Torres-Montalvo expressed to Avendano that he was displeased with the seizure of the merchandise and with the legal fees of his employee.'0° He also expressed that he needed to make a new deal to compensate for his "big loss. '' 1°1 Avendano relayed this information to Ochoa, who agreed to another deal with Torres-Montalvo, this time for thirty kilograms. 0 2 Torres-Montalvo insisted that the deal would take place in Texas. 03 Avendano, acting as middleman, met with Ochoa and another man named "Baldy" at an airport in ' See id. The court explained that "the standard for finding a waiver of venue is much more relaxed than the rigorous standard for finding waivers of the right to trial by jury, the right to confront one's accusers or the privilege against compulsory self incrimination. " Id. (quoting United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116 , 1124 (5th Cir. 1984 captive . 17 At one point Rodriguez-Moreno put Morillo's gun to the back of Avendano's neck, telling Torres-Montalvo that "they were just wasting time" and that they should "get it over with and just kill Avendano." 8 After Torres-Montalvo and the others talked Rodriguez-Moreno out of this drastic action, Avendano managed to escape from the back of the house and contacted his wife, who contacted the police.""
The police secured a search warrant for the Maryland property, entered the house, and arrested Torres-Montalvo and his search party."' The police also seized the .357 magnum, which was covered with Rodriguez-Moreno's fingerprints.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
District Court
Rodriguez-Moreno and his co-defendants were tried in the United States District Court of New Jersey.2 2 All were charged with conspiring to kidnap Avendano."2 Rodriguez-Moreno was also charged with using and carrying a firearm in relation to Avendano's kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1).124 At the conclusion of the government's case, Rodriguez-Moreno moved to dismiss the § 924(c) (1) count for lack of venue, arguing venue was only proper in Maryland on the firearm count, as that was the only place where the government proved that he actually used a gun."' Because this was an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit, the District Court, in an unpublished opinion, looked to the two opposing analyses offered by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. 26 Apparently persuaded by the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that a defendant is properly tried for unlawful use of a firearm in any district in which the venue is estab- 
United States v. Palma-Ruedas
All six defendants appealed from the decision of the district court, and the Third Circuit consolidated their appeals.'9 The court first examined Rodriguez-Moreno's contention that New Jersey was not the proper venue in which to prosecute him for the § 924(c) (1) offense. 3 0 In a two-to-one decision, the Third Circuit agreed with Rodriguez-Moreno and reversed the holding of the lower court.1 3 ' The Third Circuit sided with the statutory analysis provided by the Ninth Circuit in Corona, rather than with the Fifth Circuit's public policy analysis. 32 In analyzing the proper venue under § 924(c) (1), the court first adopted the "verb test," also used by the Corona court, as an aid in determining where Congress intended venue to lie.' Applying the verb test to § 924(c) (1), the majority of the Third Circuit panel determined that violation of the statute is committed only where the defendant actually "uses" or "carries" a firearm. v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 162 (1995) , then later found that the Third Circuit has afforded the venue provisions the same weight as other constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants, acknowledging that "these guarantees form the bedrock principles of our criminal justice system and should not be hastily balanced away." Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 850. [Vol. 90 UNITED STATEMS v. RODRTGUEZ-MORENO the court looked to the congressional history of § 924(c) (1) and found that there was not enough evidence of congressional intent to broaden the venue in such cases to overcome the constitutional concerns. 7 The Third Circuit panel therefore concluded that because Rodriguez-Moreno only used the gun in Maryland, New Jersey was not the proper venue for the § 924(c) (1) count" a. The Verb Test
The court began its analysis of proper venue by examining the verbs for clues as to where Congress intended venue to lie.' In applying the verb test, the Third Circuit found that § 924(c) (1) is unambiguous in designating the criminal conduct that is prohibited: "using" or "carrying" a firearm. The Third Circuit acknowledged that, when the verbs in statutes defining criminal conduct are ambiguous, the verb test might not always be appropriate. 4 But the court found the verbs defining the criminal conduct in § 924(c) (1) to be straightforward, and thus use of the verb test was considered proper. 14' The verb test has been adopted as an interpretive venue-determining tool in at least half of the federal circuits. The Third Circuit not only worried about the statutory interpretation of § 924(c) (1), but also expressed concern with the constitutional implications of judicially broadening venue.1 4 6 While the government argued that a strict interpretation of venue would cause undue hardship, the Third Circuit noted that the government could have tried Rodriguez-Moreno on both the predicate crime and the separate firearm crime in a single trial in Maryland.
14 7 While acknowledging the potential administrative efficiency, and thus the policy persuasiveness, inherent in the government's argument, the court emphasized that many constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants are inefficient and costly, such as the right to counsel.
14 8 "Nevertheless, these guarantees form the bedrock principles of our criminal justice system and should not be hastily balanced away. ', 49 The Third Circuit thus affirmed that constitutional guarantees should trump administrative efficiency. 50 
c. Congressional History Analysis of § 924(c) (1)
Recognizing that Congress does have the power to broaden venue in a constitutionally acceptable manner, the court examined the possibility that Congress intended for the venue of the firearm offense to be appropriate in any venue where the underlying crime is appropriate. ' Because Congress could have enacted a provision tying the venue of the gun crime to the to the Child Support Recovery Act); United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1994 54 Instead, the court should look to "the substance of the statutes in question," rather than relying on "grammatical arcana." 155 Judge Alito argued that one should first look to the nature of the crime as defined 116 by the statute. In this case, the nature of the crime was using a firearm in conjunction with the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking. 57 Because the underlying crime is a critical element of the separate gun offense, Judge Alito argued, venue is constitutionally accegtable wherever the venue for the predicate offense is proper.
The dissent bolstered this analysis by arguing that defining venue broadly in this case is supported by the legislative history of § 924(c)(1).'-9 Representative Poff, the statute's sponsor, stated that "the prosecution for the basic felony and the prosecution under my substitute would constitute one proceeding out of which two separate penalties would grow."' ' 6 Thus, Con-11 See id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946) , which held that when "nothing in either the statute or the legislative history... show [s] an intention on the part of Congress to depart from the Sixth Amendment's command," courts must determine venue by looking to the nature of the crime and where it was committed).
" See id. (citing United States v.Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944) , which concluded that "[i]f an enactment of Congress equally permits the underlying spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage to be respected rather than to be disrespected, construction should go in the direction of constitutional policy.. .").
. 22,232 (1968) ).
gress emphasized the importance of the underlying crime to the § 924(c) (1) offense, which, according to Judge Alito, helps establish the propriety of tying venue to the predicate offense. 6 The dissenting judge argued further that the courts have acknowledged the intimacy with which the firearm offense and predicate offense have been congressionally wed by holding that only one gun crime can be appended to a single underlying crime. 162 Finally, Judge Alito insightfully noted that a defendant is just as likely to have significant ties to where she commits the underlying crime of violence or drug-trafficking, as she is to where the gun offense occurs, 163 thus effectively undermining the argument for separating venue based on the traditional justification of placing the trial in a familiar place for the accused. 1 6 Therefore, Judge Alito reasoned that it is not offensive to the Constitution to tie the venue to the predicate crime when charged with a § 924(c) (1) offense. 0
The government, noting that the Third Circuit's holding was in conflict with a Fifth Circuit decision, 1 petitioned for review.1 Thus, a court first must identify the criminal conduct and then "discern the location of the criminal acts.' 72 Though acknowledging that the Third Circuit's verb test can be a useful tool in determining venue, the majority nonetheless submitted that the Court has "never before held.., that the verbs are the sole consideration in identifying the conduct that constitutes an offense." 7 3 In this case, the Court expressed concern that because "the crime of violence element of the statute is embedded in a prepositional phrase and not expressed in verbs," the Third Circuit overlooked the essential conduct element of the statute.
Thus, the majority found that the verb test, applied rigidly, unduly limits the inquiry about the nature of the offense, which creates a concern that statutorily prohibited conduct may be missed. 7 5 Justice Thomas explained that § 924(c) (1) contains two distinct conduct elements: "using and carrying" a gun and the commission of the violent crime. 76 Therefore, the government had only to prove that a firearm was used "during and in relation to" the acts constituting kidnapping in the course of a drug 
transaction.
1 7 7 Rodriguez-Moreno contended that the firearm crime was not relevant to the New Jersey kidnapping crime because he never used the firearm in NewJersey. The Court responded first that § 924(c) (1) does not define a "goint-in-time" offense, as the crime may cover several districts.
A kidnapping, the predicate crime, once begun, ends only when the victim is free, thus it makes no sense to think of the crime in geographic fragments."" Because § 924(c) (1) makes it a crime to use a firearm "during and in relation to" the predicate offense, if the gun was used "during and in relation" to the kidnapping, the § 924(c) (1) crime carries throughout the kidnapping. 181 Second, the Court addressed its holding in United States v. Lombardo, 82 and agreed that "where a crime consists of distinct parts which have different localities the whole may be tried where any part can be proved to have been done."' 8 3 Justice Thomas implied by citing Lombardo that § 924(c) (1) may be tried wherever it is proper to try either of the two distinct parts: the firearm offense and the violent crime offense.
Furthermore, § 924(c) (1) creates a unitary continuing crime of distinct parts. ts Congress has provided that any continuing offenses can be prosecuted "in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed., 18 6 Therefore, the majority concluded, it is proper to prosecute the defendant in any district where the underlying crime was committed, so long as the gun offense was committed "during and in relation to" the underlying offense."" The Supreme Court held that, because it was proper to try the kidnapping in New Jersey, the § 924(c) (1) offense could be tried there as well. 1 8 The majority opinion acknowledged the venue provisions within the Constitution,"" but did not examine the case in light of constitutional analysis, 19 despite the substantial constitutional examination conducted by the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. 19 ' The Court also failed to discuss any implications that may stem from this opinion when lower courts analyze venue -192 provisions in the future.
B. DISSENT Justice Scalia 193 agreed with the majority that one must look at "the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it."' 19 He disagreed, though, that the § 924(c) (1) crime is committed "either where the defendant commits the predicate offense or where he uses or carries the gun. ' 95 The crime can be committed, Scalia contended, only where the "defendant both engages in the acts making up the predicate offense and uses or carries the gun., 196 The majority, according to the dissent, mistakenly relied on Lombardo, which held that if a crime has distinct parts which have been committed in different localities, the crime may be tried in any locality where any one part can be proved to have been done. 7 Justice Scalia said the reliance on Lombardo is unwarranted here because Rodriguez-Moreno's alleged crime did not consist of "distinct" parts that occurred in two separate places.' 9 8 Rather, Justice Scalia noted "[i]ts two parts are bound inseparably together by the word 'during. ' See id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting). " 'Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting) .
The dissent agreed with the majority that both the kidnapping and the use of the gun are not in themselves "point-intime" offenses, as they both can extend over a protracted period of time and to several places.° Section 924(c) (1), though, can be violated only where both acts happen simultaneously, argued Justice Scalia, who pointedly proclaimed that " [t] his is what the ,,201 ote word 'during' means.
In other words, § 924(c) (1), like the crime of kidnapping, has the potential to cross venue borders, but only if the gun is actually used during the crossing.
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Thus, Scalia wrote, the defendant "who has a constitutional right to be tried in the State and district where his alleged crime was 'committed,'... has been prosecuted for using a gun during a kidnaping in a State and district where all agree he did not use a gun during a kidnaping." 2 3 The dissent closed by implying that this should have been a simple case if the analysis was based on the text, commenting that "[i]f to state this case is not to decide it, the law has departed further from the meaning of language than is appropriate for a government that is supposed to rule (and to be restrained) through the written word.' ' ,2 Justice Scalia, like the majority, refrained from analyzing the constitutional aspects of this case. 05 It is unclear whether the dissent believed the case simply could be decided on statutory interpretation, or if it believed constitutional analysis to be unwarranted.
V. ANALYSIS
The dissent correctly concluded that the majority failed to properly interpret the language of the statute.
But the dissent, by declining to place the interpretation of the statute within the context of constitutional venue analysis, 0 7 faltered before reaching a fully satisfying critique of the majority's questionable decision. This analysis seeks to bolster the dissent's conclusion, first by explaining why the dissent's statutory inter-pretation of § 924(c) (1) is more sound than that of the majority, second by addressing the proper context for use of legislative history and the verb test in interpreting § 924(c) (1), and third by answering the constitutional question of why the Court should have, within the context of § 924(c) (1), boldly guarded the now vulnerable venue provisions.
A. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The Court Mistakenly Concluded that § 924(c)(1) Has 'Distinct Parts"
Although the majority opinion claims otherwise, 2 8 § 924(c) (1) does not embody two distinct criminal elements, either of which, when violated, could provide a choice of venue in 201 which the government could properly prosecute.
The majority started the statutory interpretation correctly. 21 0 First, the Court "identif [ied] the conduct constituting the offense" and then "discern[ed] the location of the commission of the criminal acts., 21 1 But the majority then proceeded to misidentify "the conduct constituting the offense" 2 by implicating two distinct conduct elements within § 924(c) (1): the commission of the violent crime of kidnapping and "the using and carrying" of a gun. 2 ' But the language of the statute speaks only of one element of the crime: '"hoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm, shall.., be sentenced to imprisonment for five years ....
Justice Scalia, with a keen eye for the linguistically obvious, correctly argued that the gun violation can be committed only if the gun is used during the offense. 215 Thus, § 924(c) (1) offense is never committed. 217 Justice Scalia properly concluded that " [w] here the gun is being used, the predicate act must be occurring as well, and vice-versa." 2 1 8 The statute cannot logically be read another way as the violent offense and the gun possession have to coincide before a § 924(c) (1) offense is committed. 2 19 To avoid the problem of explaining the illogical, the majority simply never addressed the problem posed by the word "during.
Instead, in explaining how the statute has "distinct parts," as required by the Lombardo analysis, the Court conclusively noted the two elements of the crime.
22 1 By interpreting § 924(c) (1)'s "conduct element" as having two distinct parts, the majority, in effect, wrote the word "during" out of the statute. 2 2 This is troubling, as Congress is the more appropriate institution to make such an important statutory revision. Because § 924(c) (1) does not have distinct parts (the crime can only be committed where the underlying act of violence is accompanied by a firearm), the Court's reliance on Lombardo for the proposition that, if a crime consists of distinct parts, the venue may lie where any part can be proved 224 is therefore mistaken. Section 924(c) (1) is not violated until both the use of the gun and the predicate crime coincide, an unhappy coincidence which apparently only happened in Maryland.
Congressional Intent Does Not Justify the Court's Conclusion that Venue was Proper in NewJersey
The majority declined to justify a relaxed construction of § 924(c) (1) based on congressional intent, although it was vigorously argued by the government. 2 21-22, Rodriguez-Moreno (No. 97-1139) .
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[Vol. 90 statutory language. 7 Second, the government's congressional intent argument was weak, and therefore would not advance the majority's opinion a . 2 2 The government argued that, because Congress was concerned about the proliferation of violence when it first enacted § 924(c) (1) and as it passed subsequent amendments to that section, Congress must have meant for both the underlying crime and the use of a firearm to be distinct elements.
This argument echoes a proposition in the Palma-Ruedas dissent, which stated that "a central focus, if not the central focus, of the statute is the commission of the underlying crime." 2 '0 Congress, though, enacted § 924(c) (1) as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968,2" creating a more logical inference that Congress enacted § 924(c) (1) with the intention of punishing the illegal use of firearms and not simply to enhance punishment for the underlying crime. 2 What little is recorded of the congressional debate focuses on whether § 924(c) (1) would be constitutional if applied to state crimes and not on whether this statute would deter the predicate crimes. 233 While Representative Poff, the statute's sponsor, made statements that would lead one to reasonably infer the statute was enacted for reasons of deterrence, 4 it would be unreasonable to further infer that Congress intended the predicate offense and firearm offense to be distinct elements. 35
22 Cf City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 Ct. , 1783 Ct. -87 (1995 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority was willing to intrude upon statutory plain meaning without a clear statement of Congress's intentions while asserting that his reading of the statute allowed him to avoid considering whether legislative history was "either authoritative or persuasive").
2" See United States' Brief at 21-25, Rodriguez-Moreno (No. 97-1139 235 Representative Poff did say that "the prosecution for the basic felony and the prosecution under my substitute would constitute one proceeding out of which two separate penalties may grow." 114 CONG. REC. 22,232 (1968) . While at first blush one might interpret this statement as implicating a venue preference, it actually merely shows that Representative Poff correctly expected that most § 924(c) (1) offenses would occur in the same venue as the predicate crime. And the fact that the dismay that colonists could be forced to go to England for trial, and that English soldiers did not have to be tried for their alleged crimes within the colonies.2 5 The royal government, it was perceived, could determine a likely outcome through the choice of venue.2 6 To the colonists, this was unacceptable.2 7 Thus, the limitation of vicinage and venue to the place where the crime was committed became an important right protected by many of the inde pendent colonies, and later by the United States Constitution.
Further, the right to have a jury from the district where the crime was committed (the vicinage provision), which has historically been indistinguishable from the right to a proper venue, was placed in the Sixth Amendment, surrounded by other rights which limits governmental power, including the right to a speedy trial, the right to be informed of the government's accusation, and the right to counsel. The Supreme Court's decision in this case is constitutionally dangerous on three levels. First, it allows administrative convenience, even without legislative branch approval, to trump a constitutional right.
2 0 Allowing the government to choose the most favorable tribunal for the prosecution places the government in an inherently better position from which to try the case. 2 Conversely, the accused will be forced to expend more resources as evidence and witnesses, which are more likely to be found where the offense took place, are left behind. 26 While this is appealing from a public policy position, as taxpayers have a monetary incentive in allowing federal prosecutors to work as efficiently as possible, the provisions of the Constitution protecting the rights of the accused "should not be hastily balanced away." 26 ' Giving the government an inherent advantage over the accused in tribunal choice cuts against the spirit of the venue guarantees within the Constitution. t s Second, this decision provides a precedent that invites governmental abuse, as the government in similar factual situations can actively choose the most favorable venue in which to try the case. 2 70 By allowing the government to try Rodriguez-Moreno in a jurisdiction of questionable constitutionality, the Court has implicitly stretched the boundaries within which government prosecutors work.
2 1 ' The Supreme Court essentially allowed the government in this case to choose, anywhere along the path from Texas to New York, the forum in which to try the § 924(c) (1) offense. 272 While the prosecutors ostensibly (and most likely) tried the case simply in the most convenient fo-
27S
rum, nothing prohibits the government now from choosing a 274 forum in a similar case for purely strategic reasons. In Corona, one can imagine that the government felt more comfortable tryCf id. ("Essentially the government wants to have the option of venue.., it does not want to be restricted to trying these cases in the venue where the § 924 violation occurred.").
27 Kershen, supra note 12, 121 F.3d " See Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 850 n.5.
2'
See STORY, supra note 19, § 925 (stating that a purpose of the venue provision was to guard against being subjected to a jury who may "cherish animosities, or prejudices" against the accused). constitutional protections. 2 Thus, where Congress does not explicitly enact a constitutionally acceptable venue provision, constitutional concerns should persuade the Court to err on the side of strict venue interpretation. 28 6 VI. CONCLUSION The Supreme Court in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno held that venue was proper in a prosecution under § 924(c) (1) in any federal jurisdiction where the underlying crime was committed. 28 7 Because § 924(c) (1) defines a unitary crime with two distinct elements, according to the majority, it is proper to prosecute the defendant in any district where the underlying crime was committed, so long as the gun offense was committed "during and in relation to" the underlying offense.
'
s The majority, though, errs by reading the word "during" out of the statute, leading to the mistaken conclusion that § 924(c) (1) presents two separate offenses. 2 273, 276 (1944) . See also supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
